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Abstract 
 
Online trolling is typically studied in the IS literature 
as an uncoordinated, anarchic activity. Coordinated, 
strategic online trolling is not well understood despite 
its prevalence on social media. To shed light on this 
prevailing activity, the present study examines the 
proposition that coordinated online trolling is timed to 
leverage macro societal unrest. In testing this 
proposition, we analyzed the dynamics of the Russian 
State’s coordinated trolling campaign against the 
United States beginning in 2015. Using the May 2018 
release of all Russian Troll Facebook advertisements, 
this study constructs a topic model of the content of 
these ads. The relationship between ad topics and the 
frequency of Black Lives Matter protests is examined. 
We argue that the frequency of Black Lives Matter 
protests proxies for civil unrest and divisiveness in the 
United States. The study finds that Russian ads related 
to police brutality were issued to coincide with periods 
of higher unrest. This work also finds that during 
periods of relative calm (evidenced by lower frequency 
of protests) Russian ads were relatively innocuous.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Online trolling is prevalent on social platforms.  While 
academicians have produced scattered definitions of 
online trolling, the provenance of the term is such that 
the articulation of a stable and generally accepted 
definition may remain elusive. One definition states 
that online trolling is “the practice of behaving in a 
deceptive, destructive or disruptive manner in a social 
setting on the internet with no apparent instrumental 
purpose” [2, p. 97]. This definition implies that trolling 
is inherently anarchic. However, the trolling 
referenced in this study were well coordinated and had 
very specific, non-anarchic goals.  
 
In a January 6th 2017 Intelligence Community 
Assessment (ICA) [1], it was announced that the 
United States intelligence community, in a rare and 
unanimous opinion, believed that the Russian 
government attempted to interfere with the United 
States presidential election and electoral process. The 
report, ICA 2017-01D, is a coordinated assessment 
involving intelligence information collected by The 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and The National 
Security Agency (NSA). It is important to note that the 
report does not cover the effects of any purported 
activity by Russian state and state-sponsored actors, 
but describes that activity. At the time of the 
assessment, the intelligence community had sufficient 
evidence to report that “Russia used trolls as… part of 
its influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton. 
This effort amplified stories on scandals about 
Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the 
election campaign” [1, p. 4]. According the ICA, a St. 
Petersburg based entity, “Internet Research Agency,” 
(IRA) described in the report as consisting primarily 
of professional trolls spear-headed this effort.   
 
Since the publication of ICA 2017-01D, additional 
details regarding Russian state and state-sponsored 
activities to subvert ordinary democratic processes in 
the United States have been released with increasing 
specificity. The U.S. Congress, in the final months of 
2017, released a list of 2,752 (since deactivated and 
scrubbed) Twitter handles that Twitter Inc. flagged as 
emanating from Russia’s Internet Research Agency. 
Shortly after, in February of 2018, the textual content 
of thousands of Tweets issued by these accounts is 
released. In November of 2017 the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence provided the public with a 
sample of Facebook advertisements created by the 
IRA. Finally, in May of 2018 congress published the 
comprehensive list of Facebook advertisements 
(3,393) and metadata pertaining to them. An often-
cited objective of these trolling campaigns is to sow 
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discord in the voting populace by amplifying voices on 
different sides of polarizing issues. This is the 
“trolling” activity referenced in the ICA. In particular 
(and we show this later) the Russian IRA, when 
creating Facebook advertisements, homed in on the 
Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. The ICA refers 
to a subset of tactics used by Russia as trolling. The 
“trolling” activity described in the ICA is a 
coordinated activity, planned outside of the targeted 
platform, and executed in ordered and strategic 
fashion. However, much of the IS literature is focused 
on trolling as individual, uncoordinated behaviors for 
the amusement of the individual perpetrators [3]. 
Coordinated, strategic online trolling is not well 
understood. This research addresses the gap in 
academic coverage of online trolling where a central 
actor coordinates the activity of multiple virtual 
personas and entities.  
 
This study aims to shed light on coordinated and non-
anarchic online trolling.  To do so, we examine the 
commonly held view that Russian troll activity is 
(Russian trolls continue to be very active) intended to 
sow discord within the American voting public. We 
analyze over 3,000 individual PDF documents 
published by the Minority in the House Intelligence 
Committee where each document corresponds to a 
single IRA ad buy. We describe the challenges in 
analyzing the data given its published format. We 
combine this data into a time series with the only 
publicly available collection of Black Lives Matter 
movement related protests. Using this novel dataset, 
we examine the strategy of IRA ad buys, testing the 
conventional wisdom that these buys were intended to 
sow discord.  
 
2. Literature  
 
The present study is amongst the first attempts by 
academic researchers to systematically make sense of 
the strategy employed by the Internet Research 
Agency in its “trolling” activities. In our context, 
extant work on Internet trolling can be divided into 
two categories: (i) individualistic, and (ii) coordinated. 
While the majority of Internet trolling research falls 
into the first category, a small but burgeoning stream 
of research is emerging with respect to the second 
category. An online trolling study is individualistic 
when it implicitly or explicitly assumes the Buckels et 
al. definition of online trolling. That is, “the practice 
of behaving in a deceptive, destructive or disruptive 
manner in a social setting on the internet with no 
apparent instrumental purpose” [2]. An online trolling 
study is coordinated if it examines strategic efforts, 
undertaken by a group, to use social media platforms 
for subversive acts.  
 
While the Buckels et al. definition does not explicitly 
rule out online trolling as a coordinated activity, 
studies employing this definition view online trolling 
as anteceded by individual nuance or as a 
manifestation of social practices [3]. Within the 
individualistic view of trolling several causal 
attributions have been proffered accounting for the 
behavior of individual trolls. In a study into the 
behavior of trolls on Wikipedia, [4] found that trolls 
repeatedly engage in intentional, harmful actions 
online, that they actively violate the terms of service 
on the platforms that they use, and that they work in 
isolation often with obfuscated virtual identities. That 
study attributes these behaviors to boredom, fun, 
vindictiveness and masochistic self-fulfillment. [5] 
identifies sexism/racism, grieving and misleading as 
intentional trolling behaviors on video game 
platforms. The individual-level antecedents to trolling 
reported in [5] comport with those in [4]. Another 
study finds a strong positive relationship between 
trolling behavior and a sadistic personality profile [6] 
while [7] find that individuals’ moods predict troll 
behavior. Some studies focus on trolling as both 
individual-level and coordinated activity [3], [8]. 
 
The second theme, coordinated online trolling, is 
relatively nascent and heavily skewed towards 
Russian activities in the Occident and in Ukraine. 
Studies in the domain have examined retweet 
networks stemming from Russian IRA trolls finding 
that IRA trolls on twitter were vastly more popular 
amongst conservatives than liberals (with respect to 
the US) [9] that troll content did not travel far beyond 
Twitter, that discussion topics produced by the trolls 
was event-specific [10] and designed to be polarizing 
by tweeting in favor of “both sides” of a divisive issue 
[11]. In some cases, these trolls have been shown to be 
aggressive, targeting particular social media users and 
topics such that those users are dissuaded from 
engaging with those topics [12]. Most of the published 
empirical studies examining coordinated, strategic 
online trolling rely on data from Twitter. Russian IRU 
use of Facebook for trolling activities has not been 
examined. Further, there are no studies linking 
Russian IRU trolling activities with real world events. 
Consequently, little is known regarding the strategic 
deployment of trolls to: (1) exploit real world events 
to enhance messaging and trolling efficacy, and (2) 
potentially effect real world events. In addition, 
existing research into online trolling in general and 
coordinated trolling by the Russian IRA in particular 
has not examined the strategic timing of coordinated 
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troll content. To fill this gap in literature,  we will 
analyze the relationship between Russian IRA 
Facebook advertisment topics and the prevailing 
social context around the time that those topics were 
broached. To do so, we construct a novel dataset that 
joins detailed Russian IRA Facebook advertisement 
data with a Black Lives Matter (BLM) protest dataset. 
The result is a time series consisting of both themes.  
 
3. Data Collection  
 
We noted that US House Democrats on the House 
Intelligence Committee released the full text as well as 
metadata associated with 3,393 promoted Facebook 
posts (advertisements). The release comprised of 
3,393 individual semi-structured PDF documents. 
House staff appear to have scanned printed copies into 
PDF format; the data is embedded with the documents 
as images. The format of the data release, accordingly, 
posed a challenge for analysis. Using a Java API for 
Tesseract OCR (Optical Character Recognition) in 
concert with Oracle’s PDFBox API we automated a 
pipeline that traverses each PDF document and applies 
OCR to the primary image embedded within the first 
page of the document.  
 
The documents follow a standard format where the 
first page contains fields regarding the content timing 
and other metadata germane to the advertisement. The 
second page is the actual rendition of the advert as it 
would have been shown to users. We do not make use 
of the second page. Once an image is successfully 
extracted from a PDF, the Tesseract OCR API is used 
to extract legible text. The pipeline ends with the 
application of heuristics to extract data from relevant 
fields for structured analysis. Tesseract OCR 
successfully extracted 2,471 ads of the original 
collection of 3,393. To inspect the accuracy of the 
OCR process we randomly sampled 30 ads from the 
collection. The OCR classifier did not significantly 
misclassify characters in any of the sampled 
advertisements.  
 
We also collected a dataset of 1,921 Black Lives 
Matter related protests and demonstrations from 
August 2014 through to May 2018. The dataset was 
crowd sourced on http://elephrame.com, a site 
dedicated to tracking these demonstrations. Below, we 
chart the count of BLM protests by quarter. The 
second half of 2016 saw a massive uptick in the count 
of protests.  
 
 
Figure 1. Count of Protests by Quarter 
 
Below we chart the count of IRA advertisements by 
quarter. Comparing the chart below with the chart 
above, there is an unmistakable alignment between the 
protests and IRA ad buys on Facebook. Indeed, a 
lagged relationship. Below, the IRA ramped up its ad 
buying activity in the second half of 2016 in general, 
and in the fourth quarter in particular. Whereas BLM 
protests ramped up in the third quarter of 2016, the 
IRA appears to have acted in the following quarter, 
sustaining that action into 2017. Clearly, there is a 
need to systematically confirm this relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Count of Ads by Quarter 
 
Each event recorded on http://elephrame.com is 
supported by a reputable news source, identified by a 
URL. As before, we randomly selected 30 protests 
from the dataset and found that all events in the sample 
were verifiable and correct. As the site did not provide 
a mechanism to download the collection, we 
automated the traversal of the site’s pages to collect 
the comprehensive list. Once the comprehensive list 
was established, we merged both datasets into an SQL 
database for analysis. 
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Figure 3. Sample Page 1 
 
 
Figure 4. Sample Page 2 
 
4. Topic Model 
 
Using the non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) 
implementation in the Python Scikit-Learn library, we 
construct a topic model from the text of the 
advertisements. NMF is a popular decomposition 
technique for multivariate data where given a non-
negative input matrix, V, two non-negative matrix 
factors are found, W and H such that their product 
approximates V [13]. NMF begins with an n x m 
matrix, V, where m is the number of observations in 
the data and n is the number of “features”. The V 
matrix is factorized into an n x r matrix, W, and an r x 
m matrix, H, where r is an input parameter specified to 
be lower than m or n [13]. In this way, NMF can be 
used to find low rank approximations of the input V 
matrix. 
 
In its application as a text mining technique, NMF can 
be used in document summarization or topic 
modelling when applied over a corpus of text 
documents. The textual input must be converted into a 
matrix representation; we elect to use a weighted 
representation of terms within documents by 
performing the term frequency dot product inverse 
document frequency (TF-IDF) transformation over a 
term frequency matrix. The result is a matrix the axes 
of which represent documents and terms, with fields 
indicating the importance of a term to a document 
given the distribution of that term over all documents 
in the corpus. The TF-IDF matrix becomes the input, 
V, to the NMF model. 
  
After removing stop words from the text of the 
Russian IRA Facebook advertisements, we generate a 
term frequency matrix over the documents limiting the 
number of terms to 1000. This matrix is subsequently 
transformed into a TF-IDF matrix prior to non-
negative matrix factorization. The number of topics to 
be extracted, r, is set to 10. The table below illustrates 
the results of our topic model. For each topic we list 
the top 10 weighted terms obtained from the W factor 
matrix. Using these terms and analyzing the 
underlying advertisement text, we developed labels for 
the topics.  
Topi
c Tokens (n=10) Label 
tp1 
black matters 
community join 
people proud lives 
blackmattersus 
matter life Black Lives Matter 
tp2 
2nd amendment 
patriots lovers guns 
supporters defend 
community join 
priority 2nd Amendment 
tp3 
self defense free feel 
safe class event 
friends bring join 
Self Defense 
Training 
tp4 
repost women 22 
powerful melanin let 
30 different day 
choose Misc/Unknown 
tp5 
com https follow 
facebook channel 
twitter awww 
instagram www 
youtube Follow Request 
tp6 
police bm brutality 
man officer cop cops 
video officers shot Police Brutality 
tp7 
stop refugees news 
latest jobs home 
taking real problem 
islamophobia Immigration 
tp8 
blacklivesmatter 
blackandproud 
blackexcellence 
blackpride blacklove 
education 
economicempowerm
ent BLM Hashtags 
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unapologeticallyafri
can 
unapologeticallyblac
k knowledgeofself 
tp9 
veterans support 
brave come 
govspending usa 
learn clinton click 
priority Misc/Unknown 
tp10 
like join social issues 
immigration illegal 
agree racial looks 
beat Misc/Unknown 
Table 1. Top 10 Topic Tokens and their Labels 
 
5. Model Specification and Results 
 
Given that existing research into online trolling in 
general and coordinated trolling by the Russian IRA in 
particular has not examined the strategic timing of 
coordinated troll content, this study poses the 
following questions: (1) are Russian IRA Facebook 
ads timed to coincide with polarizing events, and (2) 
how does the content of Russian IRA Facebook ads 
change to reflect strategic behavior in response to 
polarizing events. To glean insight into these 
questions, we advance the following empirical model: 
 
𝑌𝑡−𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑚
𝑚+2
𝑗=2
+ 𝜀𝑡 
 
Where the dependent variable is a count of protests 
between some time t and some other time t – i where i 
is denominated in days. Time periods in this model are 
daily intervals. In several cases, multiple IRA ads are 
introduced in a given day. Accordingly, impressions at 
time t is the sum of impressions for all ads introduced 
during that time. A topic m at time t is the sum of 
scores for topic m across all advertisements introduced 
at time t. The model coefficients are estimated using a 
Poisson regression to account for the non-negativity of 
the count based dependent variable. Impressions, the 
count of Facebook users who saw the advertisement is 
rescaled using a min-max scaler to account for the 
extreme dispersion in impressions; some 
advertisements were never seen while others were  
seen millions of times. In the histogram below, the 
sum of topic weights across the collection of 
advertisements is given. Topics t1 and t6, 
corresponding to Black Lives Matter hashtags and 
police brutality respectively, are clearly dominant 
themes in the corpus. Media reports (see above) reflect 
this finding, providing partial support for our topic 
model. 
  
n =797
Variables coef P>|z| coef P>|z| coef P>|z| coef P>|z| coef P>|z|
constant 2.601 0*** 1.043 0*** 0.353 0*** 2.6246 0*** 1.0114 0
impressions -0.006 0.962 -0.389 0.224 -0.126 0.764 0.0882 0.458 -0.0274 0.92
Black Lives Matter -0.031 0.689 -0.018 0.924 0.205 0.394 0.167 0.017** 0.1614 0.333
2nd Amendment 0.028 0.482 0.135 0.140 0.232 0.038** 0.0372 0.392 0.1974 0.047**
Self Defense Training -0.318 0.003*** -0.965 0.006*** -1.252 0.038** -0.5928 0*** -1.6421 0***
Misc/Unknown -1.189 0*** -0.902 0.036** -0.530 0.340 -0.9672 0*** -0.8205 0.023**
Follow Request -0.547 0*** -0.936 0*** -1.755 0*** -0.9065 0*** -1.278 0***
Police Brutality 1.024 0*** 1.084 0*** 1.347 0*** 0.9741 0*** 1.195 0***
Immigration -0.016 0.792 -0.133 0.425 -0.007 0.973 0.1055 0.037** 0.1303 0.234
BLM Hashtags -0.724 0*** -0.290 0.260 -0.998 0.063 -0.6559 0*** -0.7547 0.017**
Misc/Unknown 0.235 0.007*** 0.107 0.632 0.121 0.695 -0.009 0.928 -0.0011 0.996
Misc/Unknown -0.249 0.035** -1.765 0.009*** -3.124 0.005*** -0.0625 0.419 -0.09 0.648
Log Likelihood -6959.2 2376.6 -1707.3 -7034.9 -2642.9
Pearson Chi-Squared 16700 3960 3960 16500 6020
*** .01 significance level; ** .05 significance level
Table 2. Empirical Results
i =
10 1 -10 -10
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Figure 5. IRA Advertisement Topics 
 
Below, we present the results of our analysis. We 
examine different configurations of the dependent 
variable by toggling the size of the date range from 
which protest counts are computed. Recalling the 
model shown in the formula above, i represents the 
outer boundaries of a date range. For instance, if i = 
30, then, for a given time period, we are examining a 
dependent variable computed as the count of protests 
in the 30-day date range prior to the period. Negative 
values of i denote a forward looking dependent 
variable. For instance, if i = -30, then, for a given time 
period, we are examining a dependent variable 
computed as the count of protests in the 30-day date 
range following the period.  
 
When i = 1 or i = -1 the dependent variable is the count 
of BLM protests on and one period before a given 
period and, on and one period after a given period 
respectively. We construct our time series based on 
daily intervals. As such when i = 0 we are examining 
protests that occurred on the same day as the creation 
of a given advertisement. The results above include 
several significant relationships between the count of 
BLM protests and the topics of Russian IRA ads. 
 
The police brutality topic is positively and 
significantly associated with the occurrence of BLM 
protests in all intervals at the .01 level. Indeed, the 
coefficient (to be interpreted on a logarithmic scale 
due to the log linking function used in a Poisson 
regression) values increase the closer i is to 0. This 
may indicate that the IRA detected and responded 
quickly to domestic unrest regarding police violence. 
This finding is supported by recent work [14] showing 
that “Black Lives Matter protests are more likely to 
occur in localities where more Black people have 
previously been killed by police” (p. 400). It is 
reasonable to expect, then, that messages amplifying 
the killing of Black people by police will be associated 
with an uptick in BLM protest activity around the time 
of the killing. Our work does not support any causal 
inferences. This model cannot show that Russian IRA 
advertisements related to police brutality lead to an 
uptick in BLM related protest activities. However, the 
strong association between BLM protests and police 
brutality related advertisements is more likely 
suggestive of astute opportunism on the part of the 
Russians. It is reasonable to assume that Russian IRA 
agents were monitoring Western news for reports of 
Black deaths stemming from police encounters.  
 
With respect to the forward-looking models (where i < 
0) we note positive coefficient in the police brutality 
topic. The strength of the positive association between 
these ads and BLM protests diminishes as the time 
interval widens. Again, this does not indicate that IRA 
adverts on Facebook caused protests but that upticks 
in protest activities as a result of police killings last for 
several days. We do, however, assert that this research 
demonstrates the need for a carefully crafted causal 
study into this matter.  
 
Most topics are negatively associated with BLM 
protests. This finding comports with media reports 
about the content of the Russian IRA Facebook 
advertisements. If it holds that BLM protests proxy for 
periods of unrest, then it stands to reason that the 
Agency would tend to post inflammatory messages 
that coincide with increased protest activity. Our 
interpretation of these negative coefficients is as 
follows. During ‘quiet’ periods and using the count of 
BLM protests in a period as proxy for ‘quietness,’ the 
topic composition of IRA ads shifts away from police 
brutality. For instance, the self-defense training topic 
(tp3) is significantly negatively associated with the 
count of BLM protests for all tested values of i. This 
indicates that during calm periods, rather than attempt 
to inflame, the IRA sought to pass its Facebook 
accounts as normal and innocuous.  
Given these results, we can proffer the following 
responses to our research questions.  With respect to 
the first research question, “are Russian IRA Facebook 
ads timed to coincide with polarizing events” we show 
that Russian IRA Facebook ads are carefully timed to 
coincide with polarizing events. For our second 
research question, “how does the content of Russian 
IRA Facebook ads change to reflect strategic behavior 
in response to polarizing events”, we show that the 
content of Russian IRA Facebook ads became 
increasingly inflammatory in response to polarizing 
events, but became mundane in response to periods of 
relative calm. 
 
6. Limitations  
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There are several important limitations to this research 
and its findings. One such limitation is causal 
inference. The findings here are by no means causal in 
nature. This means that we cannot infer from this 
model that Russian IRA Facebook advertisements 
caused any changes in the frequency of BLM protests 
in subsequent periods. Another limitation is the fact 
that, at the time of this writing, we have been unable 
to extract data from about a quarter of the IRA 
advertisements released by the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence. While we do not observe 
any systematic bias introduced by these missing data 
points, we do acknowledge that the effect of the 
missing data is largely unknown. Finally, we 
acknowledge the fact that the dependent variables, 
where i ≠ 0, overlap. We adjust for this by estimating 
model coefficients for i = 0 such that, for those 
estimates, there is no overlap. A future study will use 
known corrections to efficiently estimate a model 
under these conditions.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Our study shows that the Russian State attempted to 
sow discord in the United States via information 
warfare, a tactic that has gained popularity in the 
Russian intelligence services in recent years [1], [9], 
[12]. These activities are a case of coordinated online 
trolling. The dynamics of their use of information for 
subversive purposes in the United States presents an 
opportunity to examine general propositions about the 
timing of coordinated trolling activity. The use of 
professional trolls in one Internet Research Agency to 
strategically subvert normal democratic processes in 
the US is bourgeoning area of study. This study 
leverages a collection of Russian IRA produced 
promoted posts (ads) on Facebook released by 
Democrats on the US House Select Committee on 
Intelligence in May, 2018. Using data extracted via 
OCR from this release, we match advertisements to 
BLM protests. To do so, we take advantage of the only 
publicly available list of BLM protest activity. We 
extract a collection of 10 topics from the text of the 
ads. We subsequently develop a model to shed light on 
the association between ad topics and protest 
activities. We find that ads about police brutality were 
positively associated with protest activity by BLM 
activists and sympathizers. We also find that ads about 
all other topics were negatively associated with protest 
activity. These findings allow us to conclude that 
Russian IRA trolls were opportunistic, placing ads 
timed to coincide with periods of unrest and division 
in the United States. We can also conclude that during 
times of low protest activity, Russian IRA trolls turned 
to more innocuous topics. 
 
This study contributes to the academic and public 
understanding of coordinated online troll behavior. It 
provides the first (to our knowledge) piece of evidence 
that coordinated trolling by foreign entities is a 
carefully timed activity. More specifically coordinated 
actors have a sense for the general political climate of 
the environments that they attack, they likely actively 
monitor the information landscape of that environment 
and alter their messaging to maximize their effect.  
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